PUBLISHED
February 22, 2026

KARACHI:

Two years after a mass uprising brought down the authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has delivered a decisive electoral verdict, choosing a leader who arrives with the promise of a political reset at home and a recalibration within the region.

Tarique Rahman led the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to a landslide victory after one of the most politically turbulent periods in the country’s recent history. The unrest built to a crescendo, ending with Hasina’s ouster in 2024 following a brutal crackdown on protesters that left some 1,400 dead and transformed public anger into a strong opposition movement.

Hasina, Bangladesh’s longest-serving prime minister, now in exile in Delhi after fleeing the country, was tried in absentia by the International Crimes Tribunal and sentenced to death. The verdict, however, opened a new diplomatic fault line. Despite requests from the interim authorities in Bangladesh, the Narendra Modi government, long seen as Hasina’s principal external backer, refused to extradite her, complicating an already fragile relationship between the two neighbours.

Over-reliance on New Delhi

The ​election result marks a pivotal moment for Bangladesh, seen by many observers as vindication of protests born of years of repression under Hasina’s rule. At the same time, it also amounts to a pointed rebuke of New Delhi’s long-standing support for her government, its domestic and foreign policies.

During her years in power, Hasina oversaw steady economic growth but paired it with an expanding apparatus of political control, marked by arrests of opponents, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Regionally, her government leaned heavily toward India, a tilt reflected in the pace of top-level diplomacy, with seven bilateral visits to New Delhi over her 15-year tenure. For critics, that rhythm of diplomacy came to symbolise a foreign policy that prioritised Indian security, connectivity, and other regional interests even while Dhaka’s core disputes with its neighbour remained unresolved.

Over time, Bangladesh’s foreign policy moved beyond pragmatic engagement with the Modi government and came to rest on a level of political alignment that many at home saw as excessive. The relationship delivered stability and economic openings, but it also created the perception and often the reality of a government willing to privilege New Delhi’s strategic priorities even over domestic political consensus.

According to independent observers, the most cited example remains security cooperation between the two countries. Hasina’s administration dismantled Indian insurgent networks operating inside Bangladesh and institutionalised intelligence sharing to a degree unprecedented in the country’s history. While this won her strong backing from New Delhi, it was carried out with minimal public debate at home, reinforcing the sense that key national security decisions were being calibrated with India’s comfort in mind rather than subjected to parliamentary scrutiny.

On connectivity, the imbalance was even more visible. Transit and transshipment facilities granted India access to its northeastern states through Bangladeshi territory, a long-standing Indian objective, but Dhaka struggled to secure similar movement on its own core concerns. The Teesta water-sharing agreement remained unresolved despite repeated assurances, and border killings by Indian forces continued with little visible diplomatic cost. At home, critics argued that concessions flowed in one direction, while reciprocity was deferred indefinitely.

Energy cooperation followed a similar pattern. Bangladesh became increasingly dependent on Indian electricity imports, locking in a structural reliance that, many experts said, narrowed policy flexibility. Large infrastructure and power deals with Indian firms were pushed through with speed, often without the transparency that might have built public confidence. For a country that had historically guarded its strategic autonomy, the optics of the India–Bangladesh relationship, observers said, appeared politically damaging and increasingly one-sided even toward the end of Hasina’s rule.

Diplomatically, Hasina’s government was careful not to publicly contradict India on sensitive regional questions. Whether in multilateral forums or bilateral disputes, Dhaka’s tone, experts noted, was always measured to the point of silence. This caution was viewed by supporters as disciplined statecraft, but by opponents as self-censorship meant to appease the Modi government, which had come to be seen as a political guarantor of Hasina’s rule.Her exile in Delhi after her ouster only provided more credibility to that narrative. The refusal of the Modi government to extradite her, reinforced the belief that the relationship had been personalised and politically underwritten in ways that outlasted her time in office as Bangladesh’s premier. According to critics, it suggested a depth of political investment between the two leaderships that went beyond conventional neighbourly ties.

None of this negates the fact that Hasina maintained working relationships with China, Japan, the Gulf states, and the West. But those engagements were largely economic and transactional. The political and security core of her foreign policy rested with India, and it is that asymmetry which now dominates the domestic critique.

In the final assessment, by aligning so closely with New Delhi, experts believe, the former Bangladeshi leader insulated her government internationally while leaving herself exposed at home, a trade-off that has become central to the debate over the country’s foreign policy recalibration.

​A much-needed reset

With the BNP back in power, Rahman, Bangladesh’s first male premier in three decades, faces a critical test – managing ties with volatile neighbours India and Pakistan. At a recent rally, he told supporters, according to the BBC: “Not Dilli, not Pindi — Bangladesh before everything,” signaling a break from both Delhi and Rawalpindi. Still, after Hasina’s exit, Dhaka’s interim government quickly moved to patch things up with Islamabad. Direct flights to Karachi restarted after 14 years, Pakistani ministers visited for the first time in 13 years, senior military officials swapped trips, security cooperation resumed, and trade jumped 27% since Hasina’s ouster.

The optics, as the BBC noted, are hard to miss – a relationship that was once frosty between Dhaka and Islamabad has visibly improved. Even Indian analysts acknowledged that under Hasina, Bangladesh had kept Pakistan at arm’s length. “What was unusual was the near absence of engagement with Islamabad during Hasina’s tenure. The pendulum had swung too far in India’s direction; now it risks swinging too far in the other,” Smruti Pattanaik of the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses told the BBC.

From what Rahman has said so far, it doesn’t look like either Delhi or Islamabad will be ignored. The BNP leader has already received calls from both capitals, with greetings exchanged through official channels. While Pakistan may have gained a slight edge, India’s refusal to extradite a Bangladeshi leader who opposed Rahman’s mother, former prime minister Khaleda Zia, leaves a sour note.

On a political level, Rahman has to navigate a path with Hasina’s backers in Delhi while also keeping an eye on public opinion — still raw from the crackdown on genuine protesters that helped topple his predecessor. Every step toward India will be watched closely, and misreading the mood at home could be costly.

Even after the court sentenced Hasina, anti‑India sentiment runs deep in Bangladesh. Years of perceived interference, combined with her open reliance on New Delhi, have left many seeing India as a symbol of outside control. Anger still surfaces on the streets, in social media debates, and in political rallies, often tied to broader frustrations over governance and inequality.

At the same time, the picture is mixed. Some youth groups and hardline factions push strong anti-India rhetoric, but a large part of the population approaches ties pragmatically, aware of the importance of trade, energy, and regional stability. Rahman’s challenge will be walking that line, asserting independence without cutting off essential cooperation.

All that said, every handshake, every phone call, every trade deal now carries weight for the new Bangladeshi government. Move too close, and critics will cry surrender, push too hard, and key economic and security ties could fray. Anti‑India sentiment is both a warning and a constraint for the new leadership in Dhaka. How Rahman navigates it will define not just his credibility at home, but Bangladesh’s position in the region for years to come.

Old assumptions and path ahead

The political verdict in Bangladesh, observers note, opens the door for the region to rethink old assumptions. South Asia, as one expert told Al Jazeera, can no longer be treated as the backyard of one power or another, and Dhaka’s new foreign policy will have to acknowledge that reality. Change, however, he said, won’t happen overnight, such shifts are usually gradual, shaped by domestic politics and regional pressures.

Over the years, observers have repeatedly cautioned that Dhaka will have to embark on a path of careful recalibration. That said, Bangladesh is likely to maintain its ties with India, but must also explore a more balanced approach toward China, testing relationships and asserting its own interests. At the same time, Dhaka could look to strengthen engagement with the United States and normalise relations with Islamabad, marking a subtle departure from the Hasina-era policy of swinging completely in New Delhi’s favour.

The significance lies less in dramatic shifts than in the message it sends that Bangladesh is willing to act independently, evaluate partnerships on its own terms, and signal that its foreign policy will not be dictated by old alliances and assumptions. After years of perceived overreliance on Delhi, the new leadership has an opportunity to show that decisions will be guided first by national interest rather than external expectations.

Under Rahman, the BNP’s task will be to hedge carefully, expanding options, avoiding dependence on a single partner, and projecting that Dhaka’s voice matters. In effect, Bangladesh under its newly elected leader could emerge as a more assertive player in South Asia, quietly balancing relations between major powers and regional players, testing old ties, and sending a signal that the country can no longer be taken for granted, as it was by India for much of Hasina’s four-term rule.